Fighting the Abu Sayyaf: A Pretext for U.S. Intervention In the Philippines

By Madge Kho

The U.S. unfolded the second phase of its “war against terrorism” in mid-January when it sent some 650 Special Forces to the Philippines to fight the Abu Sayyaf, a tiny kidnap-for- ransom band based in the southern Philippines. The U.S. claims the Abu Sayyaf is a “terrorist” group linked to Osama Bin Laden’s Al Qaeda network even though evidence of their link is dubious according to the New York Times.

Under the cover of an existing Philippine-U.S. military agreement, the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA), these troops will be deployed in Zamboanga, at the southern tip of the island of Mindanao. The VFA was signed in 1998 by then-President Joseph Estrada. It provides for joint military exercises between these two countries. These exercises began in 2000 and were confined to areas where there is no existing civil strife. The shift in the training exercises to Mindanao is a significant deviation from the provisions of the VFA.

Mindanao is the home of several Muslim rebel groups, which have been fighting the central Philippine government for the past 30 years. One of the groups, the Moro National Liberation Front, signed a peace agreement in 1996. The other major group, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front, is still in the process of peace talks with the Arroyo Administration.

The Philippine Constitution currently prohibits the presence of foreign ground troops on Philippine soil. After 100 years of U.S. troop presence, the Philippines rejected the renewal in 1991 of a Philippine-U.S. Military Bases Agreement. This ended the presence of two large U.S. naval and air bases in that country, Subic Naval and Clark Air Field bases.

The U.S. admits that its Special Forces will be training and providing maintenance support to the Light Reaction Company, an elite counter-terrorist unit of the Philippine military. In addition, U.S. troops will play rear guard to some 10-15,000 Filipino troops assigned to the islands of Basilan and Jolo. Basilan is where the Abu Sayyaf has been holding three of the remaining 21 hostages taken from the Dos Palmas Resort Hotel on Palawan Island in June 2001-- two U.S. nationals and a Filipino; the rest of the hostages were released after ransom payments were made. In 2000, the Abu Sayyaf had taken some 20 hostages from Sipadan Island of Malaysia and brought them to Jolo. All of the hostages were released after a multimillion-dollar ransom was paid by the Libyan government.

Opponents of U.S. troops, including some Philippine government officials, allege that moving the Balikatan exercise to Basilan and Jolo is a pretext for U.S. involvement in an internal problem of the Philippines and is no longer a simple military exercise. The U.S. has said that its troops will shoot at the Abu Sayyaf only if shot at. “Well, “ as one observer noted, “they will definitely be shot at.”

The Abu Sayyaf, which once fought for an Islamic state in Mindanao, has been reduced to a rag-tag bandit group of about 100 men. Why then would it be difficult to capture them? Philippine Ambassador to the U.S. told Jim Lehrer in an interview on January 16, 2002 that the Philippines needs sophisticated equipment such as night vision scopes, sniper rifles, and other military hardware to fight the Abu Sayyaf in the mountainous terrains of Basilan and Jolo. But Maritess Vitug and Glenda Gloria, two journalists who investigated this issue, concluded that the reason why the Abu Sayyaf has been able to get away with their misdeeds is because local police and military provide support to the Abu Sayyaf in return for a cut of the loot and ransom money the group gets. A Roman Catholic priest recently testified in the Philippine Congress that he was present in June 2001 when the hostages were taken to a hospital on the island of Basilan. Philippine troops had surrounded the hospital compound and were awaiting the arrival of troop reinforcements when a general reversed the request. Then, the soldiers guarding the back of the hospital somehow turned the other way when the Abu Sayyaf escaped with their remaining captives into the jungles; the other hostages had been released after ransom was paid.

The kidnap-for-ransom phenomenon has plagued the Philippine south since 1987. It has recently caught international attention because hostages have included foreign tourists, causing an embarrassment for the Philippine government.

But hostages or not, the case of the Abu Sayyaf has been blown out of proportion for good reasons. For the Philippine Government, it provides an excuse to secure more money from the U.S., which has promised to aid allies in its “war against “terrorism.” Since September 11, the Philippines has received $100 million in military aid and a promise of $4.2 billion in security assistance. The Philippine government is cleverly scheming to involve the U.S. in its 30-year old civil war with the Moslem separatist movement and the New People’s Army in the north. The govenrment in March stopped any further peace talks with the Moro National Liberation Front claiming that it has harbored Abu Sayyaf members despite denials by the MILF.

For the U.S., it is an opportunity to regain its foothold and enhance its military presence in Southeast Asia, weakened since the closing of its military bases in the Philippines in 1992. As one U.S. diplomat said, “What the U.S. needs is capability to station its military aircraft and vessels for a short while for reconditioning and the Philippines is a very ideal spot.” It is also a pretext for unfolding a new operations against Muslim insurgencies in Southeast Asia, Al Qaeda- linked or not.

The Mindanao rebellion has been festering for the past 30 years since Marcos declared martial rule in 1972. This region has long suffered impoverishment, with an average income of only a fifth of the national average. A 1996 peace accord did very little to improve people’s economic security, and animosities towards the Manila government continued to mount. Despite the 1996 peace accord with the Moro National Liberation Front, the Philippine Government has continued to face resistance from the Moro Islamic Liberation Front, which wants a share in the governance of Mindanao.

Conservative estimates of civilian casualities run in the tens of thousands while refugee figures are said to reach over 7 million since the war began in 1972. Two million refugees were created in 2000 alone when President Estrada declared an all-out war against the MILF and heavily bombarded MILF strongholds.

The military exercise, which is to last from six months to a year, marks the largest deployment of U.S. military forces engaged in actual combat against Moros since the turn of the century when Moros resisted U.S. colonization of the area from 1901-1913. Spain which ruled the Philippines for 300 years never succeeded in colonizing Mindanao; only during the U.S. colonization were Mindanao and Sulu eventually made part of the Philippines.

Even if the U.S. succeeds in crushing the Abu Sayyaf, unless drastic change comes to Mindanao, continuing discontent with Manila will spawn the growth of new rebel groups. The Philippines will most likely label them terrorists to justify more U.S. military support; and the U.S. will conveniently oblige to maintain its military positioning in Southeast Asia.

________

Madge Kho is a native of Jolo and is a long-time Philippine activist. She can be reached at chongga@juno.com.